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STUDENTS HAVE RIGHTS, Too: THE DRAFTING OF
STUDENT CONDUCT CODES
Jason J. Bach*

"[P]erhaps the best advice that can be given is that it is
safer to err on the side of giving students too many
rights, rather than too few." 1
I. INTRODUCTION

College and university student conduct codes2 serve two
distinct purposes: (1) to guide student behavior and (2) to
establish procedural mechanisms that safeguard the rights of
students accused of conduct that violates a campus code. The
level of protection afforded students varies greatly and depends
on several factors. This article reviews the factors that those
who draft or revise student conduct codes must consider,
whether the institution is public or private. 3
Certain
inalienable rights are so fundamental to fairness that they
must be observed in the rules governing student disciplinary
hearings. To deny a student these rights is to deny the student
a fair hearing.
Not surprisingly, however, college and university judicial
affairs administrators have organized to limit the rights of
* Jason J. Bach is an association with Potter Law Offices in Las Vegas, Nevada. He
was a member of the charter class of the University ofNebada, Las Vegas, Boyd School
of Law, graduating in 2002. He also studied abroad in 2001 at Oxford, University, New
College. Mr. Bach has been an avid supporter, member, board member, and chapter
president of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).
1. Karla H. Fox, Due Process and Student Academic Misconduct, 25 Am. Bus. L.J.
671, 700 (1988).
2. The term "Student Conduct Code" is used throughout this article to refer to the
principal body of rules and policies regulating student conduct, whether it is called an
"Honor Code," "Students Rights and Responsibilities," "Student Code of Conduct," or
some other title.
3. This article will often cite to previous and current student conduct codes
adopted by the U. of Nev., Las Vegas (UNLV). The current UNLV policy, adopted in
Aug. 2000, is one of three student conduct codes in which the author has participated
in either drafting or redrafting.
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students. The Association of Student Judicial Affairs (ASJA)
maintains that due process is not required in campus hearings
and must yield to the "educational" and "developmental
mission" of the institution. 4 Additionally, the ASJA advocates
that schools provide only "the bare minimum of 'process' to
satisfy a judge," but fails to consider the rights of the student. 5
This article flatly rejects such an approach. The ASJA chooses
to ignore well-established law that students hold a property
and/or contractual interest in their education and are entitled
to the fundamental fairness embodied in due process, whether
they are at public or private institutions. 6
As much as the ASJA would like to deny a student his
rights, neither principles of fairness nor the rule of law are on
its side. In fact, schools that take steps to recognize students'
rights find that procedures designed to protect students' rights
protect the schools themselves, as those procedures reveal the
relevant facts underlying the disciplinary action, and insulate
the school from lawsuits alleging a breach of the student's
rights. 7
This article begins with a general explanation in section II
of the rights and responsibilities of students. Section III
examines the legal principles that govern both public and
private institutions. Next, procedural due process is reviewed
in section IV by looking at the constitutional requirements for
public institutions and the aspirational objectives of private
institutions. Finally, in section V, the article analyzes the
substantive due process rights of students.

II. STUDENT RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
A. Student Bill of Rights

Whether an institution is public or private, it should adopt
a student bill of rights that includes the rights protected by the
4. Letter from Elizabeth Baldizan, Pres. ASJA, to David Gergen, editor of U.S.
News & World Rep. in response to, "Is There Any Justice in Campus Courts?" U.S.
News & World Rep., 2 (Aug. 30, 1999) (copy on file with BYU Education & Law
Journal).
5. Edward N. Stoner, Reviewing Your Student Discipline Policy: A Project Worth
the Investment 11 (2000).
6. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975); Tedeschi v. Wagner College, 404
N.E.2d 1302, 1306 (N.Y. 1980).
7. Alan Charles Kors & Harvey A. Silverglate, The Shadow University, 270-271
(The Free Press 1998).
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United States Constitution and the constitution of the
particular state in which the institution resides. In addition,
rights may be added or elaborated upon to meet the particular
purposes of a college or university environment. Those rights to
be considered include:
• Due process, guaranteeing substantive and
procedural fairness;
• Freedom from discrimination on the basis of race,
sex, age, religion, creed, national origin, disability, or
sexual orientation;
• The right to engage in inquiry and discussion, to
exchange thought and opinion, and to speak, write, and
print freely on any subject;
• The right to exercise one's rights and freedoms
without fear of university interference;
• The opportunity to participate in the formulation of
policy directly affecting students through membership
on
appropriate
committees
and
in
student
organizations;
• Ready access to established university policies and
procedures;
• The right to engage in peaceful and orderly speech,
protest, demonstration, and picketing within the public
forum which does not disrupt the educational functions
of the university;
• The right to adequate notice of charges alleged;
• Protection from unreasonable searches and seizures;
• The right to be represented by an attorney or other
advisor;
• The right to cross-examine witnesses; and
• The right to an open hearing. 8
These are just examples of the basic rights that any student
conduct code should expressly protect. Institutions should go
further to afford students other rights, such as the general
right to a fair and speedy resolution after due notice has been
provided. In addition, to ensure a fair process, the accused
student should have full discovery privileges, including access
to all of the evidence that may be used against him, and should
8. U. of Nev. Las Vegas, Student Conduct Code (2000) (rev. version adopted Aug.,
2000) (hereinafter "UNLV Student Conduct Code").
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have ample time to review and investigate the evidence.
It is not enough, however, for a school to go through the
motions of enacting a student conduct code. For any such code
to have credibility, the institution must abide by it. In Lightsey
v. King, 9 a student was given a grade of "zero" for cheating,
even after the institution's Honor Board found him "not guilty"
of the allegations. The court held that, "there was no difference
between failing to provide a due process hearing and providing
one but ignoring the outcome. By holding the Honor Board
hearing and then disregarding its result, the Academy violated
Lightsey's right to due process." 10
The procedural protections necessary to preserve students'
rights will be discussed in greater detail throughout this
article.
Each institution should evaluate the need for
additional protections which assure that students obtain and
receive a fair process that leads to a reliable determination of
the issues.

B. Institutional Duties to Inform Students of Their
Responsibilities
Institutions owe students a duty to inform them of the
actions for which they will be held accountable. Descriptions of
actions that will violate the student conduct code may vary
from a simple statement of responsibility, such as "any conduct
unbecoming of a student," to a laundry list of possible
infractions. The ideal code lies somewhere in the middle.
Code drafters must be cautious not to prohibit any activity
that is protected by other sections of the conduct code, or is an
otherwise protected right of students. Additionally, overly
broad codes fail to serve one of the central purposes of a
student conduct code, which is to put students on notice of the
conduct expected of them.
Among the many issues for a school to consider is whether
the procedures established in the student conduct code apply to
accusations that a student violated a federal, state, or local
law. Concerns about interfering with the criminal justice
process, and thereby violating students' rights, led former
Boston University President John Silber to determine that
colleges should not attempt to discipline students for alleged
9. Lightsey u. King, 567 F. Supp. 645 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
10. !d. at 649.
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crimes, but instead should report them to the police. 11 The
responsibilities imposed on students, however, will depend
greatly on the type of institution they are attending, whether
public or private. 12
Ill. LEGAL PRINCIPLES THAT GOVERN BOTH
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS

A. Constitutional Law
Public institutions are required to provide a certain level of
due process and other constitutional rights to their students
because they act as an arm of the state. 13 Private institutions,
however, are not bound by the United States Constitution to
provide the same level of safeguards.
The courts have
consistently set private schools apart, despite the fact that the
vast majority of private colleges and universities receive loans,
grants, and scholarships from the federal government, and
thus appear to be quasi-public institutions. The United States
Supreme Court held in Rendell-Eaker v. Kohn, 14 that an
otherwise private school does not engage in "state action," 15
even when public funds account for as much as 99% of the
school's operating budget. 16 The Court compared the fiscal
relationship between the private school and the state to private
contractors who use state funds to build roads, but are not
state actors. 17 Had the Court ruled otherwise, private schools
receiVmg substantial public funds would have been
constitutionally required to protect the rights of their students.
However, both private and public institutions have moral,
ethical, and educational duties to treat accused students with
respect, dignity, and fairness, regardless of legal duties. While
students at private schools may not have a constitutionally
protected property interest, they nonetheless hold important
contractual interests and deserve to be treated with the
fundamental fairness that is at the heart of the due process
11. Paul E. Rosenthal, Speak Now: The Accused Student's Right to Remain Silent
in Public University Disciplinary Proceedings, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1241, 1249 (1997).
12. See e.g. UNLV Student Conduct Code.
13. Goss, 419 U.S. at 574.
14. Rendell-Eaker u. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
15. !d. at 844 (White, concurring).
16. !d. at 8:~2.
17. !d. at 840-841.
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protections of the United States Constitution. That said, it
would be disingenuous to suggest that private institutions will
voluntarily consent to be held to the same standards for
application of rights afforded to public school students. But
even if private institutions are not persuaded by fairness and
justice, other issues must be considered.
B. Contract Law
Both public and private institutions establish a contractual
relationship between themselves and their students. Most
universities have adopted written student conduct codes, or
general policies of fairness, which are distributed to students.
Courts have held that schools may not deviate from the express
due process protections established in their student conduct
codes, whether they are public or private institutions, as such
deviations would violate the implied contractual interests of
the student. 18
To understand whether a contract exists between a student
and an institution, one must examine the elements of a
contract. A contract requires that there be a bargain, which
includes both a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange
and "consideration." In contract law parlance, consideration 19
is the returned promise or performance bargained for. For
example, a student pays tuition in consideration for an
education. An institution provides education in consideration
for tuition.
The terms of a contract need not be fully expressed and
contained within a formal document, but may be implied by
law, or by the parties' conduct, or by other evidence of mutual
assent. 20 There are two types of implied contracts, implied-infact and implied-in-law. 21 An implied-in-fact contract "is one
that is inferred from the statements or conduct of the parties.
It is not a promise defined by the law, but one made by the
parties, though not expressly."22 Student conduct codes, for
example, are implied-in-fact contracts. In contrast, an impliedin-law duty arises when the contract is silent, but the law
18. Tedeschi, 404 N,E.2d at 1306.
19. Restatement (Second) of Contracts ~17(1)(1981).
20. Arthur Linton Corbin. Contracts vol. 3, § 541, 97 (West Publg. Co. 1960); see
also Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorialllospital, 710 P.2d 102.5, 1036 (Ariz. 1985).
21. Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1036.
22. Id.
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requires that a duty be imposed even though the parties may
not have intended it?'
A contractual relationship begins when the institution
accepts the student's application for admission. 24 The effect of
the acceptance is to make an irrevocable offer to the successful
applicant, usually for a limited period of time, for a seat in the
entering class. By making a deposit before the offer expires,
the applicant extends the offer until the beginning of the school
year. Before classes start, the applicant will arrive on campus
and register, thereby becoming an enrolled student. If the
student is a degree candidate, he expects to be offered a
curriculum which, if completed satisfactorily, will lead to the
degree. The student further expects that the school will treat
him fairly, including not being subjected to arbitrary grading or
dismissal, extreme tuition hikes, or a sizable escalation of the
degree requirements. These expectations are implied-in-law
terms of the contract that the student enters into with the
institution.
Though not explicitly spelled out, they are
essential to the student's ability to benefit from the bargain he
entered into with the institution, and are thus implied as part
of the contract. Payment of a student's tuition constitutes
consideration for these expectations?5
In return, the school expects payment of tuition and fees
and compliance by the student with a set of rules, both
academic and non-academic, as a member of the university
community.
The school's expectations, like those of the
student, are implied-in-law terms of the contract. These
mutual understandings and expectations form the essence of a
contractual relationship. 26
An additional, and essential, part of the student-university
relationship is the implied-in-fact contract created by a written
student conduct code. Usually issued annually, the student
conduct code is one of the primary documents used by the
school to describe to students the academic and non-academic
requirements and limitations placed upon them. The student
conduct code puts students on notice that their continued
23. Id. (citing Arthur Linton Corbin, Contracts vol. 1, § 17, 38 (West Publg. Co.
1960))
24. Curtis .J. Bergpr & Vivian Berger, Academic Discipline: A Guide to Fair
Process for the University Student, 99 Col urn. L. Rev. 289, 318-319 (1999).
25. I d. at 319.
26. Id.
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enrollment is subject to their obedience of the school's rules,
and also informs them of the procedures to be followed in the
event of any alleged disobedience. The written code provides
the terms and conditions to be followed by both the school and
the student, thus creating an implied-in-fact contract between
the school and the student.
In Tedeschi u. Wagner College, 27 a private college suspended
a part-time student because of her alleged disruptive and
abusive conduct during and outside class. The student filed
suit seeking monetary damages and reinstatement in the
college. 28 She alleged that the school had not given her a
hearing or any opportunity to defend herself. 29 The New York
state trial court entered judgment for the defendant, holding
that the United States Constitution did not apply because the
private college was not "state involved," and because the
school's informal procedure was carried out in good faith and
was not arbitrary. 30 After a split Appellate Division affirmed,
the New York Court of Appeals reversed, ordering that the
student be conditionally reinstated. 31
The court pointed to a college brochure, "1976-1977
Guidelines of Wagner College," which outlined Wagner's
procedure for adjudicating academic and non-academic
suspension or dismissal. 32 The college had failed to convene the
Student-Faculty Hearing Board, which the guidelines required,
prior to suspending the student. 33 On appeal, she argued that
the student-private college relationship is contractual and that
an implied term of the contract is that the school will observe
its own rules. 34
In short, New York's highest court held:
Whether by analogy to the law of associations, on the
basis of a supposed contract between university and
student, or simply as a matter of essential fairness in
the somewhat one-sided relationship between the
institution and the individual, we hold that when a
university has adopted a rule or guideline establishing
27. 404 N.E.2d at 1302.
28. ld. at 1304.
29. ld.
30. ld.
31. Id. at 1307.
32. ld. at 1304.
33. ld. at 1306.
34. Id. at 1305.
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the procedure to be followed in relation to suspension or
expulsion that procedure must be substantially
observed. 15
Since Tedeschi, a number of other courts have required that
private schools act in accordance with their published policies. 36
For example, in Fellheimer v. Middlebury College, the United
States District Court for the District of Vermont held that
Middlebury College was contractually bound to provide
students with the procedural safeguards and rights it promised
in its publications. 37
To deviate from those published
procedures would make the hearing fundamentally unfair. 38
In addition, a university's suspension or other punishment
of a student without good cause violates the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, which is an implied-in-law term of the
contract. 39 The covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires
that neither contracting party do anything that will injure the
right of the other to receive the benefits of their agreement. 40
In this case, the right of the student to receive an education,
and the right of the university to educate others. It imposes on
the school a good faith duty, at a minimum, to substantially
adhere to its published disciplinary procedures. "In certain
circumstances, breach of contract, including breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, may provide the basis
for a tort claim."41

35. !d. at 1306. (emphasis added)
36. Fellheimer v. Middlebury College, 869 F. Supp. 238, 244 (D. Vt. 1994) (college
breached its contractual duty when it failed to put student on notice of all charges
against him); Holert v. U. of Chi., 751 F. Supp. 1294, 1301 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (student is
entitled to the procedural safeguards that the school agreed to provide); Schaer v.
Brandeis U., 735 N.E.2d 373, 381 (Mass. 2000) (a university should follow its
established rules); Anderson v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 1995 WL 813188, 1, 4 (Mass.
Super. 1995) (courts may intervene when school's action was arbitrary and capricious).
37. 869 F. Supp. 238 at 242.
38. !d. at 246.
39. See Corbin, supra n. 20, at 97; Samuel Williston, The Law of Contracts vol. 5,
§ 670, 159 (3d ed., Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1961); Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1038 (citing
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1981)); Savoca Masonry Co. v. Homes & Son
Constr. Co., 542 P.2d 817,821 (Ariz. 1975).
40. See Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1038 (citing Comunale v. Traders & General Ins.
Co., 328 P.2d 198, 200 (Cal. 1958)); Fortune v. Natl. Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d
1251, 1257 (Mass. 1977).
41. See Wag{?enseller, 710 P.2d at 1038-1039 (citing Noble v. Natl. Am. Life Ins.
Co., 624 P.2d 866, 868 (Ariz. 1981)); Seamen's Direct Buying Serv. v. Stand. Oil Co. of
Cal., 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984), overruled; Wallis v. Super. Ct, 207 Cal.Rptr. 123
(1984); Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1982).
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In Napolitano v. Trustees of Princeton University, 42 a New
Jersey state court held that a university disciplinary hearing
that resulted in the withholding of the student's degree for one
year failed to comply with the university's own rules because
the student was not informed in a timely manner that she had
the right to cross-examine witnesses. The court ordered the
disciplinary committee to rehear the matter and, at that
hearing, to allow the student to call any witnesses she wished
and to cross-examine any witnesses presented against her, as
the school rules provided. 43
Princeton had not refused to allow the student to crossexamine adverse witnesses, but had failed to inform her in a
timely fashion that she had such a right. 44 While the term
"good faith" was not used by the court, the court appears to
have been saying that the university had a good faith
contractual duty to timely inform the student that she had a
right to cross-examine witnesses, in addition to its duty to
protect the student's rights as expressly stated in the student
handbook.
C. Basic Fairness

In addition to reviewing students' allegations of breach of
contract, courts review private schools' disciplinary decisions to
ensure that they are not arbitrary and capricious45 and to
ensure that their processes are conducted with basic fairness. 46
In Anderson v. Mass. Inst. o{Tech., the Massachusetts Superior
Court went so far as to adopt a rule that the court may only
intervene in the student-private school relationship when the
student demonstrates that the school's action was arbitrary
and capricious, when the student demonstrates that the school
failed to follow its own disciplinary rules, or when the student
demonstrates that the school did not afford the student a
hearing that was fundamentally fair. 47
42. Napolitano v. Trustees of Princeton U., 453 A.2d 279 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div.
1982).
43. Id. at 281-282.
44. Id. at 281.
45. Coveney v. Pres. of' College of' the Holy Cross, 445 N.E.2d 136, 138 (Mass.
1983); Ahlum v. Administrs. of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 617 S.2d 96, 98-99 (La. App.
1993); Psi Upsilon of Phila. v. Univ. of Pa., 591 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. Super. 1991);
Anderson, 1995 WL 813188, at 4-5.
46. Cloud v. Trustees of Boston U., 720 F.2d 721, 725 (1st Cir. 1983).
47. Anderson, 1995 WL 813188, at 4.
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Such hearings at the very least should provide the
student with written notice of the charges against him
or her; a written description of the evidence upon which
the charges are based; the names of the witnesses which
the university intends to call at the hearing; an
unbiased disciplinary committee or tribunal; an
opportunity to be heard and present witnesses in his
behalf; and the right to confront and controvert the
evidence presented by the university. 48
These contractual rights found by the Anderson court are
precisely the same as the due process rights afforded students
at public institutions. 49
Another issue to consider is the bargaining strength of the
contracting parties. The contract between a student and a
school is almost always prescribed by the institution, with the
student having virtually no bargaining power. Contracts with
such power imbalances are commonly referred to as contracts
of adhesion, because one party has no bargaining power or
ability to participate in the drafting of the contract, making
that party weaker. The Restatement of Contracts, dealing with
standardized agreements, allows courts to consider the
"reasonable expectations" of the weaker party. 5° Moreover, if a
private entity performs a service of "great importance to the
public," the courts must give greater than usual scrutiny to the
terms of the entity's standardized contract with a weaker
party. 51 This power imbalance goes to the very essence of the
"one-sided relationship" described by the Tedeschi court in
reinstating a part-time student based on the school's failure to
48. !d.
49. Rut see Schaer, 735 N.E.2d at 380 ("basic fairness" in school disciplinary
hearings is not the equivalent of constitutional rights, or even procedural safeguards
afforded by the rules of evidence).
50. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §211 (1981). Standardized Agreements.
( 1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement
signs or otherwise manifests assent to a writing and has reason to
believe that like writings are regularly used to embody terms of
agreements of the same type, he adopts the writing as an integrated
agreement with respect to the terms included in the writing. (2) Such a
writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike all those
similarly situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding
of the standard terms of the writing. (3) Where the other party has
reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do
so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term, the term is
not part of the agreement.
51. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 195 (1981).

12

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2003

follow its own procedures. 5 2
Accreditation requirements give schools another incentive
to adopt and abide by fair conduct codes. Both private and
public institutions hold some form of accreditation to lend
integrity to the degrees they award. Many accrediting bodies
require that their institutional members provide at least a
minimal degree of fairness to their students. One large
accrediting organization, for example, requires that the school's
"[p]olicies on student rights and responsibilities, including
grievance procedures, are clearly stated, well publicized and
readily available, and fairly and consistently administered." 53
Accrediting bodies also provide mechanisms for students, or
others, to file complaints against a school and claim that they
are in violation of the accreditation standards.
Whether a student attends a public or private university,
he is entitled to certain fundamental rights by the United
States Constitution, by a contract, or by both. The recognition
and protection of those rights are not only just and beneficial to
an educational environment, but ensures that an accused
student is treated fairly and given an opportunity to
adequately defend himself, while not compromising the
institutional interests of the university.
IV. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS FOR PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS; AsPIRATIONAL
54
OBJECTIVES FOR PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS

A History
Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
52. Tedeschi, 404 N.E.2d at 1306.
53. New England Assn. of Schools and Colleges, Stand. for Accreditation 6.9
(adopted 1992, rev. 2001).
54. Along with denying that students are entitled to due process, the ASJA
contends that student disciplinary hearings should never be compared to criminal
proceedings, and that rights afforded accused criminals are not applicable to students.
See Stoner, supra n. 5, at 2, 7-10. While those accused of crimes are entitled to greater
due process than students, the most fundamental due process rights of any person
encountering coercive governmental action are rooted in criminal law. For that reason,
it is useful to look at criminal law as an analogy when determining students' rights.
Comparatively, an accused student and a criminal defendant hold many similarities. In
each instance, a significant and valuable interest is in jeopardy, while the individual
must defend against the nearly unlimited resources of the institution or state. In
addition, public institutions are state actors and, as such, are required to act within the
scope and strictures of the United States Constitution. Goss, 419 U.S. at 574.
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Constitution, no state may "deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law."55 The United States
Supreme Court has established that students have a property
interest in their education. 56
"[A] student's legitimate
entitlement to a public education [is] a property interest which
is protected by the Due Process Clause and which may not be
taken away for misconduct without adherence to the minimum
procedures required by that Clause."57
The first case to recognize a university student's right to
due process in a disciplinary hearing was Dixon v. Alabama
State Board of Education. 58 In this case from the civil rights
era, Alabama State College expelled nine bJack students,
without notice and without the benefit of a hearing, 59 after the
students conducted a sit-in demonstration at a public
courthouse lunch grill that refused service to blacks. 60 The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that due process required
notice and a hearing before a student at a tax-supported college
could be expelled for misconduct. 61
Furthermore, the Court made clear that a state institution
may not circumvent the fundamental right to due process by
conditioning a grant of admission upon students' agreeing to
give up their constitutional right to due process. 62 The school
must establish some reasonable grounds for its disciplinary
actions and must do so procedurally through "fundamental
principles of fairness." 63 The court would test fairness by
examining the sufficiency of the hearing and the notice
preceding it. 64
The Dixon court broadly defined the notice and hearing
required in cases of student expulsion: "[A]n opportunity to
hear both sides in considerable detail is best suited to protect
the rights of all involved. This is not to imply that a full-dress
55. U.S. Const. amend. XIV§ 1.
56. Goss, 419 U.S. at 574.
57. ld.
58. Dixon v. Ala. St. Ed. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 930 (1961).
59. ld. at 158.
60. ld. at 152, n. 3.
61. ld. at 158.
62. Id. at 156 (citing Slochower v. Ed. of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 555 (1956),
overruled).
63. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 157.
64. ld. at 158-159.
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judicial hearing, with the right to cross-examine witnesses, is
required." 65
More than a decade later, the federal District Court for the
District of Puerto Rico took due process a step further. 66 In
Marin v. University of Puerto Rico, the court held that students
are entitled to:
(1) adequate advance notice ... of (a) the charges, (b) the
specific, previously promulgated regulations under
which the charges are brought, and (c) the evidence
against the student; (2) a full, expedited evidentiary
hearing (a) presided over by an impartial, previously
uninvolved official, (b) the proceedings of which are
transcribed, at which the student (c) can present
evidence and (d) cross-examine opposing witnesses, (e)
with the assistance of retained counsel; and (3) a
written decision by the presiding official encompassing
(a) findings of fact, (b) the substantial evidence on which
the findings rest, and, (c) the reasons for the official's
conclusion. 67
The Marin court held that these due process protections must
be guarded most scrupulously when the university's action may
damage the student's standing in the community, or may
impose a stigma or "mark on one's record that may well
preclude further study at any public and many private
institutions and limit the positions one can qualify for after
termination of one's studies." 6g To date, Marin marks the outer
limit of rights recognized for students.
Until the United States Supreme Court's Goss v. Lopez 69
decision in 1975, jurisdictions remained split as to whether
students were entitled to any due process by public educational
institutions. In Goss, the Court set aside the summary 1.0-day
suspensions of nine high school students charged with various
acts of disruptive conduct during school hours. 70 "At the very
minimum," the Court held, "due process requires, in connection
with a suspension of 10 days or less, that the student be given
oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he
65. !d. at 159.
66. Marin v. U. of P.R., 377 F. Supp. 613 (D.P.R. 1974).
67. !d. at 623.
68. Id. at 622 (citing Bd. of Regents of St. Colleges u. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 57."3
(1972)).
69. 419 U.S. 565.
70. !d.
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denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities
have and an opportunity to present his side of the story.'m Had
the suspension exceeded 10 days, the Court might have
required "more formal procedures.'m The Court concluded that
the adequacy of the notice and the nature of the hearing
sufficient to satisfy due process would vary according to an
"appropriate accommodation of the competing interests
involved.'m
A landmark decision, Goss opened the gates for cases
brought by students at all educational levels. In one example
of Goss's application, Crook v. Baker,74 the federal District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that a
university student was entitled to notice and a hearing before
the University of Michigan could rescind a graduate's master's
degree on the grounds that he had fabricated data underlying
his thesis. 75 After Goss, schools could no longer deny students
their procedural due process, and expect to get away with it.
Procedural due process begins with adequate notice and a
hearing, as established by Goss. In addition, several other
factors must be considered. For example, accused students
should have the option to cross-examine witnesses, to be
represented by counsel, to elect to have an open hearing, and to
have a fair evidentiary standard of proof.
While these
considerations may seem basic and essential to achieving due
process, many institutions deny them to students.
The
following sections explore each of these considerations.
B. Adequate Notice
The Goss Court determined that high school students facing
deprivation of a property right by suspension from school must,
at a minimum, "be given some kind of notice and afforded some
kind of hearing."76 In an earlier decision, the Supreme Court
had established that "[a]n elementary and fundamental
requirement of due process ... is notice reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

ld. at 581.
ld. at 584.
Id. at 579.
Crook v. Baker, 584 F. Supp. 1531, 1556 (E.D. Mich. 1984), vacated.
Id.
419 U.S. at 579 (emphasis added).
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present their objections."77 Applying that standard in Goldberg
v. Kelly, 78 the Supreme Court held that a few days notice is
generally inadequate for the termination of welfare benefits.
Lower courts have specifically held that notice of five days or
less for an employment termination hearing is insufficient
notice. 79
In a case involving a private college, the United States
District Court for the District of Vermont reversed Middlebury
College's one year suspension of a student, holding that the
school deviated from its published notice policy by informing
the accused student of only one of the two charges that had
been brought against him. 80 The court held that the college
must "state the nature of the charges with sufficient
particularity to permit the accused party to meet the charges,"
as expressed in the school's policy. 81
What constitutes adequate notice may be difficult to
measure, but colleges and universities are clearly at an
advantage over a student who may have limited or no
resources with which to prepare for a hearing. The guiding
principle should be that students have ample time to secure
and obtain the advice of counsel, to review and investigate the
claims against them, and to prepare a defense to the
accusations made against them. Considering the limited
resources of students, a notice of fewer than ten working days
likely does not allow an accused student time to adequately
defend himself.
A sufficient notice policy not only must provide for ample
time to prepare, but also must define the method by which
notice is to be served and the information to be provided to the
accused. The University of Nevada, Las Vegas, has adopted the
following notice policy in its student conduct code:
A.
A notice of hearing letter from the Administrative
Officer must be provided to the charged student and the
77. Mullane v. C. Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); see also Memphis
Light, Gas & Water Diu. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13 (1978).
78. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970) (fairness in some cases may
require more than seven days' notice of the termination of welfare benefits).
79. Walker v. U.S., 744 F.2d 67, 70 (lOth Cir.1984) (five days' notice to a public
employee insufficient pre-termination notice); Wagner v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., :~73 F.
Supp. 876 (E.D. Ark. 1974) (one day inadequate to notify a school teacher of her
termination hearing).
80. Fellheimer, 869 F. Supp. at 246-247.
81. ld. at 246.
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complainant a minimum of ten (10) college working
days prior to any hearing. A letter of charge includes
the following information:
1. Date, time, place of hearing;
2. Specification ofthe misconduct charged;
3. Name of complainant;
4. Specification, to the extent possible, of the time,
place, person(s) involved and circumstances of
alleged prohibited conduct and name(s) of possible
witnesses; names of persons who may have
witnessed the alleged prohibited conduct.
5. Notification that the person charged may be
accompanied by an advisor of the charged person's
choice;
6. A copy of the applicable disciplinary hearing
procedures; and
7. Such other information as the Administrative
Officer may wish to include.
B.
Notices shall be either hand-delivered directly to
the person charged or sent by certified or registered
mail. Notices delivered by mail are considered delivered
when sent, provided that three (3) additional college
working days shall be added to the time period set forth
for minimum notice.
If the person charged intends to have an attorney
C.
or other representative present, he or she must notify
the Administrative Officer no later than five (5) college
working days before the hearing of the name and
address of the advisor, if any, and whether the advisor
is an attorney. If, at any time during the proceeding,
the student desires a representative or a change of
representative, that right may be invoked.
The
proceeding will be stayed for a period of no fewer than
five (5) and no more than fifteen (15) college working
days. This right may be invoked only once during any
disciplinary proceeding, unless the Administrative
Officer agrees to any additional requests for changes of
representation or unless the student's attorney
withdraws.x 2
To summanze, the UNLV code achieves fairness by
82. UNLV Student Conduct Code, supra n. 8, Section VII.
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notifying the accused student at least ten days prior to the
hearing; by providing the date, time, and place of the hearing;
by specifying the misconduct alleged; and by disclosing the
names of the complainant and witnesses who may testify. The
accused student is also provided with a copy of the applicable
hearing procedures. Additionally, the UNLV code specifies
that the accused student is to be notified by certified or
registered mail. 83
C. Hearing

Goss held that an accused student is entitled to a basic
hearing, even when the punishment is minimal. 84 When the
possible sanction is greater than the 10-day suspensions in
Goss, a greater amount of due process may be owed. 85 In
Mathews v. Eldridge, 86 the United States Supreme Court held
that three factors are important when considering the
constitutional adequacy of the procedures afforded in a given
situation and whether due process reqmres additional
procedures:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
[g]overnment's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail. 87
Institutions, both public and private, have developed many
types of disciplinary hearings.
Most commonly, student
disciplinary hearings are conducted by committees. These
committees often consist of student, faculty, and administrative
members, and are chaired by a predetermined member.
Conventional wisdom seems to be that this type of committee,
made up of a cross-section of the campus community, at least
gives the perception of being unbiased and fair. Whether this
83. !d.
84. Goss, at 419 U.S. at 581 (holding that high school students suspended for 10
days or less are entitled to notice and a hearing).
85. ld. at 584.
86. Mathews u. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
87. !d. at 335.
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is true depends on the committee selection process and the
opinions and beliefs of the individual committee members.
The selection of members for the committee is often left up
to a sole administrator or delegated to organized bodies, such
as the student council and faculty senate. Selection of the
members, however chosen, should be closely scrutinized,
similar to a court's screening of a potential jury member. At a
minimum, such scrutiny should require that the committee
members not be directly or indirectly biased against the
accused student.
Committee members should also be
competent to weigh the evidence against the applicable
evidentiary standard. An accused student should always have
the right to challenge any committee member for cause.
Some schools provide the accused student with a variety of
hearing options. These options may include the choice between
a hearing committee or a single hearing officer.
Other
institutions also offer students the opportunity to select a
hearing conducted by a "special hearing officer," who is an
attorney or has professional experience in presiding over
judicial or quasi-judicial adversary proceedings and who has no
contractual relationship with the institution.R 8
The most troubling type of hearing is one in which a single
hearing officer, usually a dean or appointed administrator,
determines the fate of the accused student, almost always
behind closed doors, with the student having no other options.
In their book, The Shadow University, Alan Charles Kors and
Harvey A Silverglate state:
There is virtually no place left in the United States
where kangaroo courts and Star Chambers are the rule
rather than the exception-except on college and
university campuses ... where not only is arbitrariness
widespread, but where fair procedures and rational factfinding mechanisms, with disturbing and surfrising
frequency, are actually precluded by regulations. 8
These flawed types of hearings lack integrity and
sophistication because they make no attempt to bring together
a cross-section from the academic community and are very
often just an administrative tool used to quickly dispense with
students who are looked upon unfavorably.
An impartial and complete hearing is an essential
88. UNLV Student Conduct Code, supra n. 8.
il9. Kors & Silverglate, supra n. 7, at 276.
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guarantee of due process.'Jo As the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals stated in Boykins v. Fairfield Board of Education, 91
"[b]asic fairness and integrity of the fact-finding process are the
guiding stars.'m
The failure of public institutions, in
particular, to adopt and administer procedures that provide a
fair and impartial proceeding subjects those institutions to
liability. Ensuring basic fairness in hearings is good policy for
both students and university administrations.

D. Cross-Examination
Cross-examination of adverse witnesses is a fundamental
constitutional right enjoyed by an accused. This right is
essential to an accused's ability to elicit unfavorable
information from the opposing party's witnesses and to show
that a witness is biased, prejudiced, or untrustworthy for any
reason. Denial of this basic right short-changes and discredits
any disciplinary hearing process.
In Davis v. Alaska, 93 the United States Supreme Court held
that the goals of cross-examination could not be achieved
"except by the direct and personal putting of questions." 94
Professor Wigmore reasoned in his classic treatise on evidence:
"Cross-examination is a right, because of its efficacy in securing
more than could have been expected from a direct examination
by a friendly examiner."95 As the United States Supreme Court
held in Pointer v. Texas, 96 "There are few subjects, perhaps,
upon which this Court and other courts have been more nearly
unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the right of
confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and
fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this
country's constitutional goal."97 A full cross-examination of a
witness upon the subjects of his examination in chief is the
right, not the mere privilege, of the party against whom the
witness is called. 98
90. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-47 (1975).
91. Boykins v. Fairfield Bd. oj'Educ., 492 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1974).
92. !d. at 701.
93. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
94. !d. at 316, quotin{J John H. Wigmore, Evidence val. 5, § 1395, 123 (3d ed.
1942).
95 .• John H. Wigmore, Evidence val. 3 § 944 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
96. Pointer v. Tex., 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
97. !d. at 405.
98. Lindsey, 133 F.2d at 369 (D.C. Cir. 1942), overruled; Heard v. U. S., 255 F.
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It may not be an exaggeration to claim, as Wigmore does,
that cross-examination "is beyond any doubt the greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." 99
Its
effectiveness in testing the accuracy and completeness of
testimony is so well understood that the right of crossexamination is "one of the safeguards essential to a fair
trial." 100 Evidence supplied through witnesses is subject not
only to the possible inaccuracies of falsification or bias, but it is
also subject to the inaccuracies which unintentionally flow from
the flaws of human observation, memory, and description.
"The annals of the legal profession are filled with instances in
which testimony, plausible when supplied on examination in
chief, has by cross-examination been shown to be, for one or
more of the reasons mentioned, faulty or worthless." 101
Certainly, no one experienced in procedural due process would
deny the value of cross-examination in bringing out the truth if
indeed, "[c]ross-examination is the principal means by which
the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are
tested." 102
The theory of cross-examination supports what has been
learned from years of practical experience.
On direct
examination, a witness, even if completely unbiased, only
discloses part of the necessary facts, chiefly because his
testimony is given only by way of answers to specific questions,
and the party producing him will usually ask only for the facts
favorable to his side of the case. Someone must probe for the
remaining facts and qualifying circumstances, and ensure that
the testimony is accurate, complete, and clearly understood.
The best person to do that is the one most vitally interested,
namely the opponent. 103 For these reasons, cross-examination
is "a right long deemed so essential for the due protection of life
and liberty that it is guarded against legislative and judicial
action by provisions in the Constitution of the United States
and in the constitutions of most, if not all, the States composing

829, 832 (8th Cir. 1919). See, e. g., Douglas v. Ala., 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965); Alford v.
U. S., 282 U.S. 687, 691 (1931), overruled; Charles A. Wright, Federal Practice and
Procedure, Criminal vol. 2, § 416 (West 1969).
99. ,John H. Wigmore, Evidence vol. 5 § 1367 (3d ed. 1942).
100. Alford, at 692.
101. Lindsey, 133 F.2d at 369; See Wigmore, supra n. 99, at§ 782(3), (4).
102. Davis, 415 U.S. at 316.
103. Wigmore, supra n. 99, at§ 1368.
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the Union." 104
A second major function of cross-examination is to show
that the witness is biased, prejudiced, or untrustworthy. "The
facts which diminish the personal trustworthiness or credit of
the witness will also, in every likelihood, have remained
undisclosed on the direct examination." 105
Cross-examination is as vital to the establishment of truth
in student discipline hearings as in court proceedings. In
Donohue v. Baker, 106 the federal District Court for the Northern
District of New York ruled that the Constitution entitled a
SUNY-Cobleskill student to cross-examine his accuser at a
suspension hearing. Because the accused student had not been
permitted to cross-examine the student who accused him of
sexual assault, neither directly nor indirectly, the judge denied
summary judgment to the defendants. 107 Like many colleges
and universities, SUNY attempted to protect the alleged victim
of sexual assault by sparing her from the mental anguish of
being questioned by her alleged attacker. 10g In Donohue, both
the accused and the accuser acknowledged that they had
sexual intercourse, but disagreed as to whether it was
consensual. 109 Therefore, witness credibility played a large role
in determining the facts of the case.
The court held, "[f]rom the record, it appears that the only
evidence that was before the panel came in the form of [the
complainant's] two statements alleging sexual misconduct and
the plaintiffs two statements denying the same." 110 The court
continued by saying that "the disciplinary hearing became a
test of the credibility of the [respondent's] testimony versus the
testimony of [the complainant]." 111 The court determined that
the fundamental right of the accused to cross-examine
witnesses outweighed any protection owed to the alleged
victim. "Regardless of how 'sensitive' the proceeding was
deemed to be," the court concluded, "the [SUNY] defendants
remained bound to observe the plaintiffs constitutional

104. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404, (quoting Kirhy u. U. 8., 174 U.S. 47, 56 (1899)).
105. Wigmore, supra n. 99, § 1368, at 37.
106. Donahue u. Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136, 147 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
107. !d. at 149.
108. !d. at 147.
109. !d. at 139.
110. !d. at 147.
111. !d.
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. ht s. " 112
ng
Under the principle of fundamental fairness in education,
both public and private universities should provide accused
students the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, whether
legally required or not. It is important that student conduct
codes not only stress fairness in the schools' educational and
enforcement functions, but also present an "appearance" of
fairness. 113 Denying an accused student his right to crossexamine witnesses diminishes that "appearance." 114 As the
Fifth Circuit noted in Dixon, "[i]t is shocking that the officials
of a[n] ... educational institution ... should not understand
the elementary principles of fair play. It is equally shocking to
find that a court supports them in denying to a student the
protection given to a pickpocket." 115 Thus, as a matter of
simple fairness, all institutions should afford students accused
of misconduct the right to cross-examine their accusers.

E. Right to Counsel
While colleges and universities vary in the degree of
representation afforded students in disciplinary hearings, most
permit some level of assistance by counsel. 116 It is not
reasonable to expect a college student to adequately represent
himself before a disciplinary hearing panel. The obviously
stressful event of a disciplinary hearing is further complicated
for the student by the participation of a college administrator
or another student, who acts as the "prosecutor" of the charges
alleged. This "prosecutor" usually has far more experience in
the process, and is certainly under far less stress. Although
many administrators complain of a student's lawyers
"infringing upon" the hearing process, considering the
adversarial nature and the potentially damning consequences
of such hearings, an accused student should be afforded the full
representation of counsel in disciplinary hearings.
In Gideon v. Wainwright, 117 the United States Supreme
112./d.

113. Larry A. Di Matteo & Don Wiesner, Academic Honor Codes: A Legal and
Ethicul Arwlysis, 19 S. Ill. U. L.J. 49, 92 (Fall, 1994).
114. !d.
115. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 158 (citing Warren A. Seavey, Dismissal of Students:
"Due Process," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1406, 1407 (1957)).
116. Fox, supra n. 1, at 683.
117. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was "'so
fundamental and essential to a fair trial, and so, to due process
of law, that it is made obligatory upon the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment.'" 118 Gideon rests upon the "obvious
truth" that lawyers are "necessities, not luxuries" in
adversarial systems of truth finding. 119 "The very premise of
our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan
advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate
objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go
free." 120 The accused's life or liberty depends on his ability to
present his defense in the face of "the intricacies of the law and
the advocacy of the public prosecutor." 121 While a student
disciplinary hearing is not a criminal trial, it is not conducted
in accordance with due process, and thus is not fair, unless the
accused has the right to representation by counsel.
Court decisions vary dramatically on the issue of
representation by counsel at student disciplinary hearings, but
courts consistently have held that students have the right to an
attorney's participation in a disciplinary hearing when the
university itself is represented by an attorney. Relying upon
Wasson v. Townbridge, 122 the court in French v. Bashful 123 held
that a group of students who participated in a series of campus
disturbances not only had a right to an attorney, but they also
had the right to the full participation of an attorney because
the university had a third-year law student prosecute the
case. 124
Courts have also frequently guaranteed students the right
to an attorney in college disciplinary hearings involving
criminal matters. In Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 125 the University
of Rhode Island charged a student with assault with the intent
to rape, a violation of the University's "Community Standards
of Behavior." The student also faced similar criminal charges
from the alleged incident. In this case, the First Circuit Court
of Appeals held that when a disciplinary hearing concerns
118. Id. at 340 (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 465 (1942), overruled); see
also Powell v. Ala., 287 U.S. 45, 63 (1932); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
119. 372 U.S. at 344.
120. Herring v. N.Y., 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975).
121. U. S. v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973).
122. Wasson v. Townbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967).
123. French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333 (E.D. La. 1969).
124. ld. at 1338.
125. Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100 Clst Cir. 1978).
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allegations surrounding a pending criminal case, the student
has a right to the advice of counsel. 126
Courts also have recognized that students have the right to
have an attorney participate in a disciplinary hearing even
when non-criminal matters are at issue. In Crook v. Baker, 127
the court held that the University of Michigan had to provide a
graduate student, who was accused of fabricating data for his
thesis, the opportunity to be meaningfully represented by
counsel, and to have that counsel fully participate in all
proceedings. 128 The court explained: "Although the rescission of
an advanced academic degree is not unprecedented, fortunately
it is an event which occurs infrequently. The procedures that
due process requires in this context could possibly be
burdensome in other more frequently occurring contexts, but
not here." 129
An adverse outcome in a disciplinary hearing can result in
damage to a student's reputation and career. This damage
could limit the student's ability to practice in his chosen
profession.
Additionally, the courts have recognized that
students have a vested liberty or property right that could be
affected by a disciplinary hearing. 130 To protect those rights,
accused students must be allowed to be fully represented by
counsel at a disciplinary hearing.

F. Right to an Open Hearing
One right enjoyed by those accused of crimes, the right to
an open hearing, is not generally recognized for accused
students. Even so, the right to an open hearing is historically
rooted as a fundamental right essential to achieving fairness.
"The fundamental requirement of due process is the
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
. f u 1 manner. "111
. d ue IS
. measure d b y a
meaning
- Wh a t process IS
flexible standard that depends on the practical requirements of
the circumstances. 132
126. !d. at 106.
127. 584 F. Supp. 1531 (E.D. Mich. 1984), vacated.
128. Id. at 1559.
129. !d. at 1557.
130. Goss, 419 U.S. at 574.
131. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333.
132. !d. at 334 (quoting Morrissey u. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)); Goss, 419
U.S. at 577-578.
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The Sixth Amendment states: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury." 133 This constitutional guarantee and
cherished right is derived from the English common law. As
John Lilburne declared in 1649 during his trial for high
treason, a public trial is "the first fundamental liberty" of a free
people. 134 Lilburne continued, "[b]y the laws of England, all
courts ofjustice always ought to be free and open for all sorts of
peaceable people to see, behold and hear, and have free access
unto; and no man whatsoever ought to be tried in holes or
corners, or in any place, where the gates are shut and barred,
and guarded with armed men." 135
When Blackstone drafted his Commentaries on the
Common Laws of England in 1765, openness had become the
rule. In the conduct of a criminal proceeding, as he explains,
"all this evidence is to be given in open court, in the presence of
the parties, their attorneys, the counsel, and all by-standers;
and before the judge and jury." 136 The reason for this,
Blackstone continues, is that "[t)his open examination of
witnesses viva voce, in the presence of all mankind, is much
more conducive to the clearing up of truth, than the private
and secret examination taken down in writing before an officer,
or his clerk, in the ecclesiastical courts, and all others that
have borrowed their practice from the civillaw." 137
Openness in formal proceedings not only facilitates arriving
at the truth more readily, but also results in all parties
connected with the proceeding performing their functions more
conscientiously. 138 Hearings conducted in secret have a scent of
grave injustice reminiscent of the Spanish Inquisition and the
English Star Chamber. In 17th century England, the Lords of
the Star Chamber proceeded as inquisitors. An accused's trial
was based on charges made by accusers unknown and not
disclosed to the accused. 139 In addition, the accused could be
133. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
134. N Cobbett's Complete Collection of State Trials, 1270, 1273 (T.B. Howell
ed., 1816).
135. Id.
136. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Common Laws of England vol. 3,
372 (1765).
137. !d. at 373.
138. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979).
139. See Geoffrey Radcliffe & Geoffrey Cross, The English Legal System 107-108
(5th ed. 1971); John H. Wigmore, On Evidence vol. 8 § 2250, 282-284 (Little Brown &
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examined under torture, with the ultimate decision left to a
court sitting without a jury. 140 Thus, the right of the accused to
have his hearings open to the public is rooted in history and
derived from English common law in response to the Star
Chamber.
In addition to historical precedents, there are other
compelling functional reasons for assuring openness of student
conduct code proceedings.
The alleged victim and the
community have an interest in seeing that offenders are
brought forward to face responsibility.
In addition, the
community has an interest in knowing that fair standards are
followed in the conduct of such proceedings and that variance
from established norms will become known. 141
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 142 the United
States Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional right to an
open, public trial is one shared by the accused and the public
and that the right to access attaches as well to pretrial
proceedings. 143 The rationale for such a First Amendment right
is found in the history of the English common law and the
constructive function of the public's presence in criminal
144
.
procee dmgs.
The right of access is the rule, and it is a rare and
exceptional case where it does not apply. 145 A court must make
"specific, on the record findings ... demonstrating that 'closure
is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored
to serve that interest."' 146 Even in those rare cases, it is the
rights of the accused, not the victim or witness, which require
protection from an open hearing. 147 The only proceedings that
courts have consistently held closed are grand jury proceedings
Co. 1961).
140. Radcliffe, at 107-108.
141. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 508-509 (1984)
(hereinafter Press-Enter. I ) (voir dire examinations of potential jurors covered by
guarantee of open public proceedings in criminal trials).
142. Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (hereinafter Press-Enter. II
).

14:3. Id. at 7.
144. See id. at 8-9.
145. See U.S. u. Haller, 8:37 F.2d 84, 86-87 (2d Cir.1988).
146. Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. at 13-14 (quoting Press-Enter. I, 464 U.S. at 510);
see In reNew York Times, 828 F.2d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1987) (relying on Press-Enterprise
II balancing test).
147. Press·Enter. I, 464 U.S. at 510; Richmond Newsps. Inc., v. Va, 448 U.S. 555,
581 (1980).
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where "the proper functioning of our grand jury system
depends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings." 148 Absent
an overriding interest carefully articulated by the trial court
for closure, the Court has stated that hearings should be open
to the public. 149 When the accused desires an open and public
hearing to answer charges against him, courts are nearly
unanimous in determining that this fundamental right may not
be abridged.
It should be noted that while an open hearing is preferable
in reaching a just and fair conclusion, this commentary in no
way suggests that an institution should forego its
responsibilities under the Family Education Rights and
Privacy Act (FERPA) of 1974. 15°
FERPA protects the
confidentiality of a student's educational records, including
disciplinary records, and thus prohibits an institution from
holding an open hearing, unless the accused student consents
to it. A student conduct code should include the option of an
open hearing upon the request of the accused. For example,
UNLV's student conduct code provides, "[t]he hearing is closed
unless the person charged requests an open hearing." 151
In this era of elevated enlightenment of "victims' rights,"
many institutions have mandated that all disciplinary hearings
be closed to protect the alleged victim from any
embarrassment, ridicule, or retaliation. This is especially true
when sexual assault is alleged. While any hearing process is
difficult for victims, the victims' discomfort does not negate the
rights of the accused or lessen the jeopardy the accused face.

G. Evidentiary Standard of Proof
At a minimum, university officials should grant an accused
student the presumption of innocence and should bear the
burden in a university disciplinary proceeding of proving by
"substantial evidence" that the student violated a provision of
the established code of conduct. 152 Many federal courts have
held, however, that such a standard is insufficient because no
148. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 (1979).
149. See Richmond, 448 U.S. at 580-581.
150. 20 U.S. C. § 1232(g) (1974).
151. UNLV Student Conduct Code, supra n. 8.
152. Slaughter v. Brigham Young V., 514 F.2d 622, 625 (lOth Cir.), cert denied,
423 U.S. 898 (1975) (some weight must be given to determining the facts when there is
substantial evidence of a violation).
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clear level of proof can be inferred from the standard. In Smyth
153
u. Lubber,
accused students were suspended after the AllCollege Judiciary found the students guilty of marijuana
possession. The federal District Court for the Western District
of Michigan held that due process required the university to set
a standard of proof greater than "substantial evidence" when
the alleged conduct was also a crime. 154 "The court is certain
that the standard cannot be lower than 'preponderance of the
evidence."' 155 In addition, "given the nature of the charges and
the serious consequences of the conviction, the court believes
that the higher standard of 'clear and convincing evidence' may
be required." 156
Many institutions have adopted higher standards of proof
than that of "substantial evidence." 157 The University of Miami
requires a finding of "clear and convincing evidence." 158 The
University of Virginia 159 and the United States Air Force
153. Smyth u. Lubber, 398 F. Supp. 777, 781 (W.D. Mich. 1975).
154. Walter Saurack, Protecting the Student: A Critique of the Procedural
Protection Affbrded to Am. and English Students in Uniu. Disciplinary Hearings, 21
.J.C. & U.L. 785, 798 (1995) (citing Smyth, 398 F. Supp. at 798); Givens u. Poe, 346 F.
Supp. 202, 209 (W.D.N.C. 1972) (due process requires that a decision be based on
substantial evidence); Herman u. U. of S.C., 341 F. Supp. 226, 231 (D.S.C. 1971), affd
per curiam, 457 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1972) ("No serious disciplinary action can be taken
unless it is based upon substantial evidence"); Speake v. Grantham, 317 F. Supp. 1253,
1281 (S.D. Miss. 1970) (disciplinary proceeding conviction must be based upon
substantial evidence).
155. Saurack (quoting Smyth, 398 F. Supp. at 799).
156. Saurack (citing Nicholas Trott Long, The Standard of Proof in Student
Disciplinary Cases, 12 J.C. & U.L. 71 (1985)) (supporting the "clear and convincing"
standard because the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is unnecessarily stringent
and the "by a preponderance" standard is unnecessarily lax).
157. DiMatteo & Wiesner, supra n. 117, at 94-95. ("We have chosen to review
what we considered the three most important procedural due process concerns: (1) the
right to cross-examination, (2) the right to representation, and (3) the standard of
review. However, a number of other 'less important' due process issues have been
addressed by the courts."). See, e.g., Gorman v. U. of R. I., 837 F.2d 7, 15-16 (1st Cir.
1988) (lack of a written transcript is not fatal; however, the student may have a right
to tape record proceedings); U. of Tex. Med. Sch. v. Than, 834 S.W.2d 425, 431 (Tex.
App. 1992) (university's failure to follow its own procedures does "not per se violate due
process"); Birdwell, 403 F. Supp. at 715 (Air Force Cadet has no privilege against selfincrimination).
158. Di Matteo & Wiesner, supra n. 117, at 94 (citing U. of Miami, U. of Miami
Undergraduate Student Honor Code 1, 8 (1986)).
159. Id. ("The Virginia ,Judicial System only provides that there 'must be
agreement of 2/3 of the trial panel' to assess guilt." University of Virginia, The
Judicial System 8 (1989). "However, the separate Honor Committee System requires a
finding of guilt 'beyond a reasonable doubt' by a '4/5ths lvotel of the committee
members.' Henson u. Honor Comm. ofU. Va., 719 F.'2.d 69,73 (4th Cir. 1983).").
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Academy require a finding of guilt "beyond a reasonable
doubt." 160 Requiring a higher degree of proof "supplies added
protection to a process lacking some of the procedural
protections found in more adversarial proceedings." 161 The
severity of possible sanctions and notation upon the academic
record make a higher degree of evidence a reasonable and fair
accommodation.

H. Conclusion
A student conduct code which provides adequate procedural
due process must ensure that an accused student receives
adequate notice, a fair hearing, the right to cross-examine
witnesses, the right to be represented by counsel, the right to
an open hearing, and a fair evidentiary standard of proof. A
failure to protect any of these rights results in a flawed system
that prevents the discovery of truth at the expense of the
student's rights.
V. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

A. In General
In addition to the procedural protections outlined above, the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a
guarantee against arbitrary decisions that would impair
appellants' constitutionally protected interests. 162
This
guarantee is called "substantive due process," and it protects
certain fundamental "substantive" rights we all share. The
Supreme Court has said of substantive due process that, "the
Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the
'liberty' it protects includes more than the absence of physical
160. !d. (citing Birdwell v. Schlesinger, 403 F. Supp. 710, 715 (D. Colo. 1975))
("The standard for determination of guilt is that of reasonable doubt and a unanimous
vote of the board.").
161. !d. ("We have chosen to review what we considered the three most important
procedural due process concerns: (1) the right to cross-examination, (2) the right to
representation, and (3) the standard of review. However, a number of other 'less
important' due process issues have been addressed by the courts."). See, e.g., Gorman v.
U. of R. I., 837 F.2d 7, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1988) (lack of a written transcript is not fatal;
however, the student may have a right to tape record proceedings); U. a{ Tex. Med. Sch.
v. Than, 834 S.W.2d 425, 431 (Tex. App. 1992) (university's failure to follow its own
procedures does "not per se violate due process"); Birdwell, 403 F. Supp. at 715 (Air
Force Cadet has no privilege against self-incrimination).
162. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 157.
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restraint." 163
It provides "heightened protection against
government interference with certain fundamental rights and
liberty interests." 164 As the court stated in Dixon, "the
governmental power to expel the plaintiffs ... is not unlimited
and cannot be arbitrarily exercised. Admittedly, there must be
some reasonable and constitutional ground for expulsion or the
courts would have a duty to require reinstatement." 165 Under
principles of substantive due process, students cannot be
disciplined for constitutionally protected actions, or for actions
which the government has no legitimate interest in punishing.
Private schools are also bound by a similar requirement.
Courts will review the disciplinary decisions of private schools
to ensure that they are not arbitrary and capricious, 166 and that
the process is conducted with basic fairness. 167
While it may seem obvious that constitutionally protected
activities may not be forbidden, it is not always obvious what
specific activities are actually protected.
Prior to being
redrafted in 2000, the UNLV student conduct code banned
several acts that were arguably constitutionally protected,
including "[t]he repeated use of obscene or abusive language in
a public setting where such usage is beyond the bounds of
generally accepted good taste"; "[c]reating a situation ... which
produces mental or physical discomfort, injury or stress, or
embarrassment, or ridicule"; and "[a]ny actions, including
those of a sexual nature or involving sexual activities, which
are intimidating, demeaning, harassing, coercive, or abusive to
another person, or which invade the right to privacy of another
person." 108 These provisions, while designed to control abusive
behavior, arguably infringed upon the First Amendment rights
of students by prohibiting protected speech, and potentially
restricting consensual acts between adults. These provisions
were eliminated in the 2000 revision.
B. Free Speech

The First Amendment provides the basis for much of the
163. Washington u. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997).
164. !d. at 720.
165. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 157.
166. Coveney, 445 N.E.2d at 138; Ahlum, 617 S.2d at 98-99; Psi Upsilon, 591 A.2d
at 760; Anderson, 1995 WL 813188, at 4-5.
167. Cloud v. Trustees of Boston U, 720 F.2d 721, 725 (1st Cir. 1983).
168. UNLV Student Conduct Code, supra n. 8, (portions repealed).
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case law arising out of school disciplinary actions. The courts
have consistently held that free speech is not a right restricted
to adults. In Klein v. Smith, 169 the plaintiffwas suspended from
high school for giving a teacher "the finger" after school hours
and off school grounds. The student filed suit. Granting an
application for a permanent injunction against school officials,
the court concluded that giving "the finger" constituted
speech, 170 and that the suspension violated the student's First
Amendment rights. 71 ]
Schools also may not interfere with protected religious
speech. The federal District Court for the Southern District of
Texas held in Chalifoux v. New Crtney Indep. Sch. Dist. 172 that
absent evidence of actual disruption, a school policy prohibiting
a Catholic student from wearing a rosary to school on the
ground that some gangs had adopted the rosary as their
identifying symbol, violated the student's religiously-motivated
speech. 173
In a recent trend, schools have attempted to take
disciplinary action against students who have used their home
computers to engage in speech that school officials find
offensive. A Missouri school district suspended a student for
posting a webpage criticizing school administrators. 174 The
webpage used vulgar language to convey the student's opinion
of teachers and the principal. 175 In addition, the webpage
contained a hyper-link to the school's website and invited
others to contact the school principal to convey their
criticism. 176 The court held that the student's homepage did
not materially and substantially interfere with school
discipline and enjoined the school district from restricting the
student's use ofhis home computer to repast the homepage. 177
In another case involving home computer usage, Zachariah
Paul, a Pennsylvania high school student and member of the
track team, composed a "Top Ten" list about the school's

e

169. Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440 (D. Me. 1986).
170. !d. at 1442, n. 3.
171. !d. at 1442.
172. Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
173. !d. at 665.
174. Beussink v. Woodland R-N Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E. D. Mo. 1998).
175. ld. at 1177.

176./d.
177. !d. at 1181-1182.
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athletic director, Robert Bozzuto. 178 The list, drafted by Paul at
home on his home computer, contained statements regarding
Bozzuto's appearance, including the size of his genitals. 179 Paul
then e-mailed the list to friends from his home computer. A
recipient of the e-mail printed the list which was ultimately
posted in the school's faculty lounge. Paul admitted to creating
the list and consequently was suspended from school for 10
days. The court overruled the suspension, holding that even
though Paul received procedural due process, the school district
violated his First Amendment right to engage in speech in his
own home. 180
C. Rational Relationship to Legitimate Interest

In addition to protecting such fundamental rights as free
speech, substantive due process assures that any government
action must bear, at a minimum, a rational relationship to a
legitimate governmental interest. In Alabama & Coushatta
Tribes v. Big Sandy School District, IHI the federal District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas provided two theories upon
which a successful substantive due process claim may be made.
First, "[i]f the suspensions were patently unreasonable or
disproportionate to the offense, the [students] would be entitled
to relief." 182 Second, if there was a "substantial departure from
accepted academic norms," 183 the student would also be entitled
to relief.
The so-called "zero tolerance" policies, enacted by many
schools in response to the publicity of school violence in the late
1990's, provide a potent example of the wholesale denial of
substantive due process. These rules usually exact immediate
and substantial penalties when students are found to be in
possession of any drug or weapon.
However, the "zero
tolerance" nature of these policies prohibits school officials from
making individualized determinations when a violation occurs.
Dustin Seal, a student at a Knox County, Tennessee high
178. Killion v. Franklin Regl. Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448 (W.D. Pa.
2001)
179. Irl. at 448.
180. Irl. at 457.
181. Ala. & Coushatta Tribes u. Big Sandy Sch. Dist., 817 F. Supp. 1319 CE.D.
Tex. 1993).
182. Irl. at 1335.
18:3. lrl.
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school, drove his mother's car to a home football game in the
fall of 1996. 184 When Seal arrived in the school parking lot,
school officials requested that Seal consent to a voluntary
vehicle search for alcohol. 185 Believing that he had nothing to
hide, Seal consented. 186 The school officials found a hunting
knife in the glove compartment of the vehicle. 187 Seal argued,
and there was evidence that suggested, that he was not aware
of the knife's presence in the vehicle. Based on the school's
"zero tolerance" policy toward weapons, however, Seal was
expelled. 188 The Seal family filed suit in federal court. 1x'>
After the federal district court ruled in Seal's favor, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed
the case. 190 The Sixth Circuit held that the school board's
decision could not survive a legitimate state interest because
expelling Seal for unknowingly possessing a knife was not
rationally related to any legitimate state interest. 191 Reversing
the district court, the Sixth Circuit explained, "[n]o student can
use a weapon to injure another person, to disrupt school
operations, or, for that matter, any other purpose if the student
is totally unaware of its presence. Indeed, the entire concept of
possession-in the sense of possession for which the state can
legitimately prescribe and mete out punishment- ordinarily
implies knowing or conscious possession." 1n Clearly addressing
supporters of "zero tolerance" policies, the court stated: "the
Board may not absolve itself of its obligation, legal and moral,
to determine whether students intentionally committed the
acts for which their expulsions are sought by hiding behind a
Zero Tolerance Policy that purports to make the student's
knowledge a non-issue." 193
Zero tolerance policies, such as those practiced in Knox
County, Tennessee, are irrational and unfair because they
trample on the due process rights of students. There appears
184. Robert C. Cloud, Say Yes to Due Process Before SayinR No to Wmpons, 15a
Ed. Law Rep. 833, 835 (2001).
185. ld.
186. !d.
187. ld.
188. ld.
189. !d. at 834.
190. Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2000).
191. ld. at 575.
192. Id. at 575-576.
193. !d. at 581.
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to be a growing sentiment, in the courts and in society, that
these policies violate students' rights. 194 In February 2001, the
American Bar Association (ABA) passed a resolution
condemning "zero tolerance" policies. 195 The ABA hopes to
influence schools and lawmakers to rethink the issue.
Providing an adequate procedural due process system does
not give a blank check to the institution to bring charges
against a student for any reason. The school's disciplinary
action must be rationally related to a legitimate state interest
and must not infringe on an established substantive right of
the student.

VI. CONCLUSION
University administrators are quick to point out that a
student disciplinary hearing is not a criminal trial or any other
type of legal proceeding. For that reason, many institutions
deny accused students some of their most basic and
fundamental rights. The longer schools thumb their noses at
due process and fundamental fairness, however, the more
likely it is that courts will intervene in their actions.
Many of the rights discussed in this article were established
throughout history as the result of controlling powers
determining the fate of individuals with the swoop of one heavy
hand. Society eventually realized that the powerful, with their
unlimited resources, were often too much for the weak to
overcome. To strike a balance, the courts began to recognize
certain rights as inalienable.
The position of power held by universities and colleges is
remarkably similar to that of the government in criminal
matters. College students are often away from home for the
first time and are forced to depend on their respective
university or college to provide food, shelter, and other basic
accommodations. In essence, the student lives at the mercy of
the school. If a student is accused of violating a school
regulation, the institution usually has a staff member or a full
department solely devoted to investigating and, if necessary,
194. Cloud, supra n. 184, at 846 (citing Sasha Polakow-Suransky, America's
Least Wanted: Zero Tolerance Policies and the Fate of Expelled Students, in The Public
Assault on America's Children: Poverty, Violence, and Juvenile Injustice, 101-129
(Valerie Polakow ed., Teachers College Press 2000).
195. Am. Bar Assn., Res. to the H. of Delegates (San Diego, Cal. February 19,
2001l.
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bringing charges against the student. Unless the student has
access to substantial financial resources, he is often left to fend
for himself.
The extension of fundamental due process rights to an
accused student does not in any way provide an advantage to
the student; rather, it establishes fairness in a process which
may have serious and life-changing ramifications for the
student. A student who is expelled is often unable to enroll in
a different school due to his inability to demonstrate to the new
school that he left his former school in good standing. A
university or college degree is required for employment in
many fields and for admission to graduate and professional
schools. In addition, employees with a university or college
degree generally earn higher salaries than those who are not
graduates.
Therefore, an expulsion made in error may
significantly affect a student's future economic opportunities
for the remainder of the student's life.
It is the role of our institutions of higher learning to
educate the members of our communities. Perhaps there is no
greater lesson than fairness and justice for all, starting in their
own backyards.

